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Periodic tenancies subject to a fetter on the tenant- doctrinal dilemmas? 
Susan Pascoe * 
 
This article analyses the legal status of periodic tenancies subject to a contractual fetter on the 
tenant’s ability to terminate the tenancy. Whereas the Supreme Court decision in Mexfield 
Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford1 concerned a fetter on the landlord who could not 
terminate except as specified in the agreement, the issue examined in this article is whether 
the principle from Mexfield imposing a grant of a 90 year lease subject to the terms of the 
original agreement would apply in the same way to a fetter on the tenant. The article 
considers the following issues: firstly, the significance of the issue where there is a fetter on 
the tenant; secondly, the problematic purported assimilation of tenancies for uncertain 
duration and periodic tenancies subject to a fetter; thirdly, the substantive nature of objections 
to fetters; fourthly, whether the judicial analysis of periodic tenancies is satisfactory; and 
lastly, the future of periodic tenancies. Explicit within the Mexfield decision is an assumption 
of a homogeneous position between landlord and tenant, so that there would be uniformity of 
principle in relation to fetters. It is suggested, however, that such an assumption may be 
mistaken, so that a different rule should apply if the fetter is on the tenant rather than on the 
landlord. 
 
1. Significance of the issue of a fetter on the tenant 
The Supreme Court in Mexfield2 held that an agreement for an uncertain term, which 
comprised a monthly tenancy subject to a fetter on the landlord, was not capable of taking 
effect as a tenancy on its terms, but since the agreement would have given rise to a tenancy 
for life prior to 1926, the effect of section 149(6) of the Law of Property Act 1925 was that 
the agreement was to be treated as a tenancy for a term of 90 years determinable on the 
defendant’s death or in accordance with the clauses in the agreement. Accordingly, the 
landlord was not entitled to possession, and the lease could not be ended by notice to quit. 
The case concerned a mortgage rescue scheme where the fully mutual housing co-operative 
association operated a mortgage rescue scheme by buying properties from home owners 
having difficulties with mortgage payments and then letting the properties back to them. The 
Supreme Court was eager for the tenant, Ms Berrisford, not to lose her tenancy and for the 
landlord to be bound by the terms of the agreement. The mischief which Mexfield was trying 
to avoid was a monthly periodic tenancy which could be terminated by the landlord serving 
notice to quit. The judges accordingly, accepted counsel for the tenant’s novel arguments to 
achieve a fair outcome for the tenant by adopting a solution which made the law “curiouser 
and curiouser”.3 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court applied this as a rule of law, it is 
argued that it is extremely unlikely where a fetter is on the tenant, as opposed to a landlord, 
that the doctrinal contours contrived in Mexfield would be applicable with the consequence 
that a 90 year lease would not be imposed on a tenant. 
                                                             
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in The Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer following peer review. The definitive published version will be available online on Westlaw 
UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Middlesex University; Solicitor (non-practising). I am grateful for the very 
helpful comments received at the Society of Legal Scholars Conference (Oxford University) in September 2016.  
1 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52; [2012] 1 A.C. 955. 
2 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52. 
3 Adopting the language of Baroness Hale in Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 
at [93]. 
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Landlords and/or tenants who need flexibility may be attracted by entering a periodic tenancy 
ab initio, and some landlords may not want to commit to a fixed term initially if they are 
concerned, for example, about the suitability of the tenant. A periodic tenancy may also arise 
where there is initially a fixed term assured shorthold tenancy or assured tenancy, and the 
tenancy then continues as a periodic tenancy on the express terms of the original agreement4 
under a statutory periodic tenancy5 under section 5(2) of the Housing Act 1988. This may 
benefit the landlord in retaining a good tenant and may be favoured by the tenant, so that the 
landlord does not raise the rent unless the landlord serves a notice under section 13 of the 
Housing Act 1988 to increase the rent. An example of where a fetter on a tenant’s ability to 
terminate the tenancy may arise is where the landlord is concerned that rents may fall, 
because of fracking in the area or a new railway line or new airport runway being built 
nearby or other economic or political factors which are likely to affect rental values. The 
landlord agrees to rent significantly below market value in exchange for a fetter that the 
tenant cannot terminate the tenancy unless specific terms are satisfied, for example, that the 
tenant loses his job or secures a job in a different town or is able to afford to buy his own 
place or other agreed term. The tenant readily agrees to these terms in order to secure a 
tenancy below market rent, but subsequently may not wish to be bound by the fetters.    
 
If a symmetrical and uniform approach to a fetter is adopted, the same rule would apply 
whether the fetter is on the landlord or the tenant, and a 90 year lease may be imposed on an 
unwilling tenant, although many would recoil from such a prospect. If the concern of the law 
is formalism and not the protection of tenants, then a homogeneous approach to a fetter 
would be adopted. Such a homogeneous approach could be termed “de-personalised 
rationality” whereby “the practice of ‘coherence lawyering’ approaches the analysis of legal 
doctrine by reducing law’s subject to a ‘de-personalised rationality’, systematising legal rules 
through fundamental principles and avoiding ‘messy and controversial discussions about the 
social consequences of the rules of private law’, which ‘appeals to coherence, consistency, 
and fidelity to principle … suffic[ing] to resolve the issue’”.6 Homogeneity of doctrinal 
analysis would underpin a purportedly apolitical style of judicial reasoning and scholarly 
analysis whereby property problems would be abstracted from the social realm. Adopting 
formal equality and legal analysis based on “neutral” values, there would not be recognition 
of the effect of these commitments for differently situated people.7  
 
By way of contrast, adopting van der Walt’s view “from the margins”, the perspective of the 
less propertied person provides a useful lens to illustrate the content given to our apolitical 
“property values”.8 Mexfield prioritises less-propertied parties over more propertied parties 
and is a significant example where, favouring justice to the tenant, benefitted the less-
propertied party, the tenant, rather than the more-propertied party, the landlord. The decision 
                                                             
4 See Leeds City Council v Broadley [2016] EWCA Civ 1213; [2017] 1 W.L.R. 738.   
5 See, for example, Superstrike v Rodrigues [2013] EWCA Civ 669; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 3848. 
6 L. Fox O’Mahony, “Property Outsiders and the Hidden Politics of Doctrinalism” (2014) 67 C.L.P. 409, 413 
citing in part from H. Collins, “Utility and Rights in Common Law Reasoning: Rebalancing Private Law 
through Constitutionalization” (2007) 30 Dalhousie L.J. 1, 6. 
7 L. Fox O’Mahony, “Property Outsiders and the Hidden Politics of Doctrinalism” (2014) 67 C.L.P. 409, 414. 
8 A.J. van der Walt, Property in the Margins (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) referred to in L. Fox O’Mahony, 
“Property Outsiders and the Hidden Politics of Doctrinalism” (2014) 67 C.L.P. 409, 426.  
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in Mexfield prevents Ms Berrisford becoming a property outsider.9 However, imposing a 90 
year lease on an unwilling tenant subject to the terms of the original agreement demonstrates 
that applying the same rule to a fetter on the tenant is undesirable, because property rights 
protection in a context of inequality is not equitable and stable in the long term.  
 
The decision in Mexfield granting the tenant a lease for 90 years subject to the determining 
conditions in the original agreement arguably embodies what Alexander terms “human 
flourishing”,10 which enables the tenant to flourish under a lease for 90 years. Leases fulfil an 
increasingly important economic and social function in addition to being a market commodity 
dealt with by market exchange or market-alienability. Radin argues against the idea that 
housing should be treated as an ordinary market commodity.11 At least as important as the 
economic function is a political-moral function that residential housing is one of the crucial 
material conditions that determine whether and how people will flourish personally and as 
citizens.12 The landlord’s interest is usually financial, a commodity, whereas the tenant’s 
interest is primarily personal and only secondarily financial. Tenants enter into a lease 
primarily to have a home,13 a place in which to belong, not as an investment. Therefore, 
Mexfield may not apply to a fetter on a tenant to impose a 90 year lease, because of the 
imbalanced, asymmetrical power relationship between landlord and tenant and due to 
recognition of the autonomy of the tenant’s home. There are numerous examples in which 
there is no synchronicity between the rights, liabilities and remedies of landlord and tenant 
with one example being the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 in the differential 
provisions in relation to the release provisions of original landlords and original tenants from 
covenants.  
 
Nevertheless, a 90 year lease is an extremely valuable and marketable asset after it has been 
registered. The Supreme Court gave Ms Berrisford a “windfall” as a result of trying to 
implement the original terms of the agreement in the fairest way to the tenant. If the same 
approach was taken to a fetter on the tenant, a tenant would be given a capital asset to sell at 
market value following registration, although the market value would obviously be affected 
by the triggers which would terminate the lease. Such issues demonstrate the problematic 
consequences of the Supreme Court accepting a solution presented by counsel to the tenant in 
order to avoid abolishing the rule on certainty of leases to achieve a just result for the tenant 
on the facts of that particular case.  
 
2. Problematic assimilation of tenancies for uncertain duration and periodic tenancies subject 
to a fetter?  
In analysing how a fetter on a tenant would be treated, it is first necessary to examine whether 
periodic tenancies subject a fetter should be treated in the same way as tenancies for 
uncertain duration due to the different ontogenesis of periodic tenancies. It is well established 
                                                             
9 See generally L. Fox O’Mahony, “Property Outsiders and the Hidden Politics of Doctrinalism” (2014) 67 
C.L.P. 409. 
10 G.S. Alexander, “Ownership and Obligations: The Human Flourishing Theory of Property” [2013] H.K.L.J. 
451. 
11 M. Radin, “Residential Rent Control” (1986) 15 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 350.  
12 G.S. Alexander, “Five Easy Pieces: Recurrent Themes in American Property Law” (2015-2016) 38 U. Haw. 
L. Rev. 1, 21; G.S. Alexander, “Governance Property” (2011-2012) 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1853, 1875. 
13 See generally L. Fox O’Mahony, “The meaning of home: from theory to practice” [2013] I.J.L.B.E. 156. 
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that leases for uncertain terms are not valid,14 and information theorists15 would argue for the 
straightforward approach adopted in Lace v Chantler16 and Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v 
London Residuary Body.17 This is in contrast to progressive theorists, who are attentive to a 
wide array of factors, especially that property should not employ simplifying rules that are 
insufficiently attentive to the values at stake.18 The progressive approach arguably 
demonstrated in Mexfield undermined the common law that requires leases to have a certain 
duration from the outset by converting them to leases for 90 years.  
 
As Hildyard J noted in Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd v Walker,19 the requirement of 
certainty of term was devised to prevent perpetual tenancies.20 The certainty of term rule 
distinguishes a lease from a fee simple and avoids the potential injustice from the perpetual 
continuation of a lease where there is no provision for periodic rent reviews.21 Leases which 
would last forever would undermine the nemo dat rule, because there are no estates in 
common law which last forever.22 Periodic tenancies used to pose a problem in legal analysis 
because they do not conform to the rule which requires leases to be for a fixed term and were 
recognised by Simpson as anomalous.23 That is because they are in effect leases for an 
uncertain duration determinable by notice. Historically, periodic tenancies derived from 
tenancies at will,24 and when they first came before the courts at the end of the fifteenth and 
the beginning of the sixteenth centuries, they provoked a great deal of controversy.25 For two 
centuries thereafter, the dispute as to the nature of periodic tenancies continued. Eventually 
the validity of periodic tenancies was recognised by Holt C.J. in Leighton v Theed in 1702,26 
and in the course of the eighteenth century, the dispute died out. Thereafter, periodic 
tenancies arose commonly by implication of law by virtue of the conduct of the parties where 
a person, who had exclusive possession of a property, paid rent on a periodic basis. 
 
It is notable that Baroness Hale in Mexfield stated that, “Periodic tenancies obviously pose 
something of a puzzle if the law insists that the maximum term of any leasehold estate be 
certain … it has always been a problem how the rule is to apply to them”.27 However, 
Baroness Hale did recognise that the rule against uncertainty applies both to single terms of 
uncertain duration and to periodic tenancies with a curb on the power of either party to serve 
                                                             
14 See A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Land Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 253; Littleton, 
sec.68. See also W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1766) Vol.2, p.143. 
15 See, for example, T.W. Merrill and H.E. Smith, “Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle” (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 1.  
16 Lace v Chantler [1944] K.B. 368. 
17 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v London Residuary Body [1992] 2 A.C. 386. 
18 J.B. Baron, “The Contested Commitments of Property” (2009-2010) 61 Hastings L.J. 917 at 920, 940, 950.  
19 Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd v Walker [2015] EWHC 1615; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 605. 
20 K.F.K. Low, “Certainty of Terms and Leases: Curiouser and Curiouser” (2012) 75 M.L.R. 401. See also M. 
Pawlowski, “Perpetually renewable leases- a reappraisal” [2014] Conv. 482.   
21 C. Harpum, S. Bridge, M. Dixon (eds), Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property, 8th edn (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2012) para.17-069 and cases in fn.298. 
22 I. Williams, “The certainty of term requirement in leases: nothing lasts forever” [2015] C.L.J. 592, 594. 
23 See A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Land Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 253-255.   
24 See Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk [1992] 1 A.C. 478 at 483 (Lord Bridge) 
quoting Blackstone. 
25 See A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Land Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 253-255. 
26 Leighton v Theed (1702) 1 Ld. Raymond 707. 
27 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [87]. 
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a notice to quit unless and until certain events occur.28 Lord Neuberger also equated the 
position of a tenancy for an uncertain term and a periodic tenancy subject to a fetter on either 
the landlord or the tenant when he stated that the position with regard to periodic tenancies 
containing a fetter on the right of either or both parties to serve a notice to quit “seems to be 
much the same”.29  He does not, however, cite specific authority for that proposition.  
 
The agreement in Mexfield could be read in one of two ways: either as a lease for uncertain 
term (until ended in accordance with clause 5 or 6) or a monthly tenancy with a fetter on 
landlord’s right to determine it. Lord Neuberger did acknowledge in relation to periodic 
tenancies, that there is not the long established learning which there is in relation to terms of 
uncertain duration.30 Later in the judgment, Lord Neuberger stated that the decision relating 
to life estate under the old law and tenancy for 90 years applies whether the agreement is for 
an indeterminate term or a periodic tenancy with a fetter on the landlord’s right to 
determine.31 Lord Neuberger’s analysis of Breams Property Investments Co v Stroulger,32 
where a periodic tenancy with a fetter on the landlord’s right to determine for three years was 
valid, demonstrates that there is room for judicial manoeuvre in deserving cases. However, 
Lord Neuberger did not consider with sufficient specificity that if the circumstances were 
different, and if the agreement was a monthly tenancy with an objectionable fetter explicitly 
on the tenant, the result would have been the same giving rise to a tenancy for life converted 
into a fixed term of 90 years under the 1925 Act.  
 
Lord Dyson seemed to equate tenancies for uncertain duration and periodic tenancies subject 
to a fetter,33 although Lord Mance treated the agreement as “being for a term uncertain” 34 
and not as a periodic tenancy subject to a fetter, and Lord Clarke also treated the agreement 
as an uncertain term.35 Hildyard J in Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd v Walker was 
unequivocal that “it is plain from Lord Neuberger MR’s judgment in the Mexfield case that 
what is expressed to be a periodic tenancy with a fetter on the landlord’s right to determine 
falls to be treated in the same way as a tenancy for an indeterminate term: paras 54-56.”36 
Treating both types of tenancy agreements in the same way eases judicial analysis and aids 
uniformity in approach and principle. However, uniformity can be a blunt instrument, which 
oversimplifies the technical nature of the rules without allowing for a nuanced approach in 
more complex cases.   
 
Assimilation of the two types of tenancy of uncertain duration and periodic tenancies subject 
to a fetter is also problematic for the additional reason that it is highly unlikely that a periodic 
tenancy with an objectionable fetter would have been treated as a life estate under the 
common law. The dual transmogrification process37 applied in Mexfield would be antithetical 
to the core essence of a periodic tenancy. The “broad brush” approach taken by the majority 
                                                             
28 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [93].  
29 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [28].  
30 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [28].  
31 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [55].  
32 Breams Property Investments Co v Stroulger [1948] 2 K.B. 1. 
33 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [115]. 
34 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [98].  
35 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [111]. 
36 Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd v Walker [2015] EWHC 1615 at [51].  
37 See K.F.K. Low, “Certainty of Terms and Leases: Curiouser and Curiouser” (2012) 75 M.L.R. 401, 404-408. 
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of judges in Mexfield, in what could be termed “leaking” the common law’s commitments 
across the categories38 to achieve an incremental development of the common law without 
any in-depth evaluation of its applicability to periodic tenancies, is arguably misguided and 
erroneous. Lord Neuberger did acknowledge that the ancient rule could lead to unjust results 
on different facts and others also recognised that in their judgments.39 A fetter on the tenant 
should indeed be such a case.  
 
It is significant that cases subsequent to Mexfield have taken unequivocal steps to avoid 
applying the lease for life reasoning as demonstrated in Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd 
v Walker40 and Secretary of State for Transport v Blake.41 The move away from Mexfield in 
Blake and Southward, and the twisting by the judges in those cases of the actual decision in 
Mexfield, are indicative of judicial unease at the dual transmogrification process, and the 
preferred judicial solution in such circumstances will be the non-proprietary solution of a 
contractual licence. In what seems to be a choice between two extremes, the middle ground 
has been lost by no proprietary interest being given at all in what may be perceived to be a 
shift away from a progressive approach to property from the perspective of the occupiers of 
the premises, although the issues are inevitably complex. 
 
3. Substantive nature of objections to fetters on rights to terminate periodic tenancy by notice 
to quit? 
Two possible grounds have been identified for challenging the validity of a provision in a 
periodic tenancy purporting to restrict, postpone or remove the right of one party to terminate 
the tenancy by serving a notice to quit.42 Firstly, the duration of the term of the tenancy is 
uncertain if it postpones the right to serve a notice to quit for an uncertain duration. Secondly, 
a purported restriction or postponement of either parties’ right to terminate by notice to quit 
may be void if it is in any other way repugnant to the nature of a periodic tenancy,43 such as 
postponing the right to serve a notice to quit for a period which was certain in duration, but of 
such a length that the right was effectively illusory. Where a provision in a periodic tenancy 
is repugnant to the nature of the periodic tenancy, the provision is void, but the tenancy is not 
invalidated.44 A case such as Centaploy v Matlodge45 can be distinguished from the scenarios 
in this article, because the term in that weekly tenancy did not provide for the landlord to be 
able to terminate at all, and the tenancy was determinable by the tenant only. Where the 
duration of the term is uncertain by postponing the right to serve the notice to quit for an 
uncertain period, Mexfield appears to proceed on the basis that the tenancy and not just the 
fetter would have been void,46 which means that the grounds for challenging the validity of a 
                                                             
38 Terminology adapted from a different context in L. Fox O’Mahony, “Property Outsiders and the Hidden 
Politics of Doctrinalism” (2014) 67 C.L.P. 409, 414. 
39 See, for example, Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [94] (Baroness Hale). 
40 Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd v Walker [2015] EWHC 1615 analysed both Zimbler v Abrahams 
[1903] 1 K.B. 577 and Clays Lane Housing Co-operative Ltd v Patrick (1984) 49 P. & C.R. 72. See further J. 
Roche, “Legal history in court: lessons from Mexfield and Southward” [2016] Conv. 286.   
41 Secretary of State for Transport v Blake [2013] EWHC 2945.  
42 Emmet & Farrand on Title (London: Sweet and Maxwell) para.26.187.  
43 See C. Harpum, S. Bridge, M. Dixon (eds), Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property, 8th edn (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2012) para.17-067. 
44 Emmet & Farrand on Title (London: Sweet and Maxwell) para.26.187. 
45 Centaploy v Matlodge [1974] Ch. 1. 
46 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [67] (Lord Neuberger) and see Emmet & 
Farrand on Title (London: Sweet and Maxwell) para.26.187. 
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provision are critical as to the determination of the outcome. However, Lord Dyson in 
Mexfield combined both objections, thereby purportedly removing any differentiation 
between them, when he stated that, “a fetter on a right to serve a notice to determine a 
periodic tenancy is ineffective if the fetter is of uncertain duration. Such a fetter is 
‘repugnant’ to a periodic tenancy: see Doe d Warner v Browne (1807) 8 East 165, 166”. Lord 
Dyson is thereby nullifying any differentiation between grounds with the consequence that on 
either ground, the tenancy would be void and not just the fetter.  
 
Construction of a fetter on the landlord was in issue in Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd 
v Walker, where Hildyard J introduced a new dimension into the analysis, by stating that 
whether the term of the agreement was uncertain depended “on whether, on its construction, 
the restriction or fetter ….. applies to the issue of possession proceedings or to service of a 
notice to quit (or both)”.47 His view was that if the fetter was on the issue of possession 
proceedings, a periodic tenancy could exist, the right to serve a notice to quit would be 
unfettered, the contractual provision would be enforceable and give rise to a defence in 
possession proceedings. If, however, the fetter was on the notice to quit, “the fetter on 
termination would be inconsistent with the characterisation of the tenancy as a weekly 
tenancy, and (subject to questions of intention) the Agreement could not take effect as such: 
as pre-1925 it would have taken effect as a defeasible lease for life, it would now be treated 
as a 90-year lease pursuant to section 149(6) of the Law of Property Act 1925”.48 Hildyard J 
would have considered himself bound by the decision in Mexfield if he followed such a 
construction. However, this differentiation analysed by Hildyard J is problematic, because the 
substance rather than the form should be the determining factor.   
 
The problem in Southward was that although the wording in the agreement seemed to draw a 
distinction between notice to quit and proceedings for possession, and the words in issue do 
“seem principally directed at possession proceedings”, Hildyard J concluded that “the more 
natural construction is that the grounds relate not only to possession proceedings but also to 
the giving of notice to quit”.49 Accordingly the agreement had to be treated as one for 
uncertain duration and enabled him to reach the conclusion that there was a contractual 
licence. That was the inevitable conclusion on this issue, because Hildyard J was drawing a 
distinction where none should conceptually exist. The nature of the tenancy and the 
circumstances in which possession proceedings can be initiated need to be indistinguishable 
for the purposes of determining the nature of the property interest.  
 
4. Is judicial analysis of periodic tenancies satisfactory? 
Insights into the nature of periodic tenancies can be derived from Hammersmith and Fulham 
London Borough Council v Monk50 where the House of Lords held that a periodic tenancy 
was determinable by a notice to quit given by one joint tenant without the concurrence of the 
other joint tenant.51 A periodic tenancy continues therefore as long as it is the will of both 
parties that it should continue. A property based argument, which would be that a joint tenant 
                                                             
47 Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd v Walker [2015] EWHC 1615 at [52]. 
48 Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd v Walker [2015] EWHC 1615 at [54]. 
49 Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd v Walker [2015] EWHC 1615 at [63].  
50 Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk [1992] 1 A.C. 478 confirming the decision in 
Greenwich LBC v McGrady (1982) 46 P. & C.R. 223.  
51 See also Newlon Housing Trust v Alsulaimen [1998] 3 W.L.R. 451. 
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cannot unilaterally terminate a joint tenant’s rights in the home without his consent, was 
rejected, and a contractual approach adopted .52 Lord Bridge differentiated the situation from 
exercising a break clause in a lease, surrendering the term, making a disclaimer, exercising an 
option to renew the term and applying for relief from forfeiture which a single joint tenant 
cannot exercise. Even though service of a notice to quit is a positive act, Lord Bridge rejected 
an analogy with those scenarios, because that would be confusing the form with the 
substance, and the substance of the matter is that by omitting to give notice of termination, 
“each party signifies the necessary positive assent to the extension of the term for a further 
period”.53  
 
Expanding this analysis vertically to the landlord and tenant relationship, it is arguable that 
the contractual analysis should be extended to enable a landlord and tenant to have different 
terms on which they can terminate the periodic tenancy, and that the law should recognise a 
periodic tenancy with a contractual fetter as binding between the original parties. The 
nomenclature “fetter” may be misleading, because it is not being referred to in the context of 
this article as a complete bar to termination by one party, which would be repugnant to the 
nature of a periodic tenancy; instead, it is used as terminology to indicate a restriction agreed 
by contract on one party’s right to terminate. Since either tenant giving the regular notice can 
determine the tenancy against the will of the other tenant, a logical progression of this is that 
contractual effect should be given to an agreed fetter, which would enable both parties to end 
the tenancy, but not on mutually identical terms.  
 
It is clear that a fetter for a specified period is valid.54 Therefore according to Lord 
Templeman’s analysis in Prudential, “A lease can be made from year to year subject to a 
fetter on the right of the landlord to determine the lease before the expiry of five years unless 
the war ends”,55 because it creates a determinable term certain of 5 years. To take an extreme 
example, a lease made from year to year subject to a fetter on the right of the landlord to 
determine the lease before the expiry of 999 years would be valid according to this reasoning, 
because it would comprise a determinable certain term, but the question should arise whether 
this is too illusory and therefore void. An analogy can be drawn with clogs on the right to 
redeem a mortgage.56  
 
A further issue regarding the nature of a periodic tenancy is whether it is regarded as an 
aggregation of distinct terms or one long term.57 If the view is adopted that it is one long 
term, then this provides additional support for the analysis that landlords and tenants should 
                                                             
52 Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk [1992] 1 A.C. 478 at 483 (Lord Bridge) and at 
491-492 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) following Doe d. Aslin v Summersett (1830) 1 B. & Ad. 135, which applied 
to joint lessors. 
53 Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk [1992] 1 A.C. 478 at 490-491 (Lord Bridge). 
This is not incompatible with the other joint tenant’s human rights- see Sims v Dacorum Borough Council 
[2014] UKSC 63; [2014] 3 W.L.R. 1600. 
54 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [33] (Lord Neuberger). 
55 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v London Residuary Body [1992] 2 A.C. 386 at 395. Lord Templeman stated 
that both Court of Appeal authorities of Re Midland Railway Co’s Agreement [1971] Ch. 725 and Ashburn 
Anstalt v Arnold [1988] 23 E.G. 128 were wrongly decided. 
56 Samuel v Jarrah Timber [1904] A.C. 323; Fairclough v Swan Brewery [1912] A.C. 565; Jones v Morgan 
[2001] EWCA Civ 995; [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank. 323. 
57 K. Gray and S.F. Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 330. 
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be able to terminate the periodic tenancy on different terms. Lord Bridge’s view in Monk was 
“that the law regards a tenancy from year to year which has continued for a number of years, 
considered retrospectively, as a single term”.58 Mexfield did not explicitly consider the issue, 
but appears to assume that periodic tenancies are considered as a succession of terms rather 
than treating each successive term as part and parcel of the original term.59 
This issue has been thrust into the spotlight in relation to the issue of liability for council tax 
by Leeds City Council v Broadley,60 where the issue was whether the landlord, Mr Broadley, 
or his tenant was the owner of the dwelling within the meaning of section 6 of the Local 
Government Finance Act 1992 when the dwelling had no resident for the period in dispute.  
By the agreement, the landlord agreed to let the premises for a term of 6 or 12 months and 
thereafter continuing on a monthly basis until terminated by either party under the provisions 
of clause 3. Rent was paid per calendar month. The issue in that case focused on whether the 
tenant had “a material interest” i.e. “a leasehold interest which was granted for a term of six 
months or more” under section 6(5) and (6) of the 1992 Act and whether there was a 
continuation tenancy comprising of both a fixed term and periodic term. The council argued 
that such a tenancy offended against the rule that requires tenancies to be of sufficiently 
certain duration and which, if contravened, meant that the purported tenancy was beyond the 
power of the landlord to create. McCombe LJ quoted from Woodfall on Landlord and 
Tenant61 and considered three 19th century cases62 to support his conclusion63 that there was a 
single grant in that case for a fixed term followed by a periodic tenancy. Accordingly, the 
tenant’s liability for council tax continued while the tenancies subsisted as periodic tenancies 
even though the tenant had gone out of occupation.  
The case is significant, because the Court of Appeal refused to allow the certainty rule to 
frustrate the decision they wished to reach. The case did not concern a fetter, but 
demonstrates that flexibility will be applied to circumvent the certainty rule to recognise 
commercial reality in appropriate cases. As McCombe LJ stated, “there is obvious benefit to 
both parties to the lease in giving a degree of initial certainty of the term’s duration, with a 
degree of flexibility thereafter”.64 If flexibility is extended to the overall structural congruity 
of a periodic tenancy, then the room for manoeuvre can be broadened to give parties more 
freedom to create periodic tenancies on mutually agreed terms.  
5. The future of periodic tenancies?  
In Mexfield, the Supreme Court refused to uphold a monthly periodic tenancy, which raises 
questions about the future of implied periodic tenancies. It is notable that the Supreme Court 
went further than Prudential, because in Prudential, the term for an uncertain period until the 
landlord needed the road for widening was held to be a valid periodic tenancy. The Supreme 
                                                             
58 Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk [1992] 1 A.C. 478 at 490 (Lord Bridge). 
Compare Superstrike v Rodrigues [2013] EWCA Civ 669. 
59 C. Harpum, S. Bridge, M. Dixon (eds), Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property, 8th edn (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2012) para.17-081 support this analysis. 
60 Leeds City Council v Broadley [2016] EWCA Civ 1213. 
61 Woodfall: Landlord and Tenant (London: Sweet & Maxwell) para.5-076. See Leeds City Council v Broadley 
[2016] EWCA Civ 1213 at [9]. 
62 Doe d. Chadbourn v Green (1839) 9 A. & E. 658; R v The Inhabitants of Chawton (1841) 1 Q.B. 247; Brown 
v Trumper (1858) 2 Beav. 11. See Leeds City Council v Broadley [2016] EWCA Civ 1213 at [10]-[13].  
63 Leeds City Council v Broadley [2016] EWCA Civ 1213 at [13] (McCombe LJ) and see also at [36] (Underhill 
LJ).   
64 Leeds City Council v Broadley [2016] EWCA Civ 1213 at [33].     
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Court in Mexfield, however, held that the tenancy in its case was not a periodic tenancy, 
which means that an implied periodic tenancy will not arise where the lease is void because 
of uncertain duration of term.65 Emmet & Farrand on Title comment that it is difficult to see 
how the implied freely terminable periodic analysis can survive except to explain any 
relationship subsequently arising when, as happened in Prudential itself, the interests of the 
original landlord and/or tenant are assigned, and the assignee tenant continues in possession 
on the same terms,66 but even this analysis may be doubtful following Mexfield.   
 
Lord Neuberger in Mexfield did acknowledge67 that if the agreement cannot give rise to a 
tenancy, then if it is not a contractual licence, the only right that Ms Berrisford could claim 
would be that of a periodic tenant on the terms of the written agreement in so far as they are 
consistent with a periodic tenancy, because she had been in possession purportedly under the 
agreement paying a weekly rent to the landlord. Lord Neuberger’s view was that it was far 
less likely that the parties would have intended a weekly tenancy determinable at any time on 
one month’s notice than a licence which could be terminated pursuant to clauses 5 and 6.68  
 
Lord Neuberger left open the question as to whether the agreement could have taken effect as 
a periodic tenancy with contractual effect being given between the contracting parties to the 
restrictions on the right to serve a notice to quit found in the agreement. Lord Neuberger 
stated that he preferred to state nothing about that point, which is disappointing, because such 
a solution would preserve periodic tenancies as well as enable the creation of proprietary 
periodic tenancies with non-proprietary contractual fetters and consequently, give recognition 
to the complex interrelationship of proprietary and non-proprietary elements of a lease. Lord 
Hope compared the position in Scotland where a lease may be granted for an indefinite 
period between the original parties.69 
 
Because the presumption of an implied periodic tenancy is no longer applied,70 and there 
would be a contractual licence instead,71 it is problematic that the contractual licence, 
although enforceable between the original parties personally, is “not capable of binding their 
respective successors, as no interest in land or other proprietary interest would subsist”.72 It is 
noteworthy that Hildyard J in Southward uses the terminology of periodic licence73 as if he is 
drawing a parallel or analogy with periodic tenancies or to somehow “elevate” the status of 
contractual licences to create a hybrid category between a contractual licence and a periodic 
tenancy.  
 
                                                             
65 Emmet & Farrand on Title (London: Sweet and Maxwell) para.26.015. 
66 Emmet & Farrand on Title (London: Sweet and Maxwell) para.26.005.01. See also Mundy v Hook (1997) 30 
H.L.R. 551. 
67 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [66].  
68 Other judges expressed similar views in Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at 
[80] (Lord Hope), at [100]-[103] (Lord Mance), at [107]-[110] (Lord Clarke), at [120] (Lord Dyson).  
69 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [75]-[79].  
70 See C. Harpum, S. Bridge, M. Dixon (eds), Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property, 8th edn (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2012) para.17-086. 
71 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [59] (Lord Neuberger), at [102] and 
[104] (Lord Mance), at [108] (Lord Clarke), at [119] (Lord Dyson). 
72 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [60] (Lord Neuberger).  
73 Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd v Walker [2015] EWHC 1615 at [96] (Hildyard J). 
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A licence is, however, problematic, because the rights of tenants are far greater than those of 
a licensee and the agreement is denied proprietary status. Apart from a tenant having 
exclusive possession whereas a licensee does not, a tenant, and not a licensee, has the 
protection of various statutory repairing provisions. The House of Lords in Bruton v London 
and Quadrant Housing Trust74 went to considerable lengths to find a tenancy, so that the 
tenant could sue to enforce repairing covenants under section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant 
Act 1985. It would arguably be doctrinally more coherent if a contractual lease were created 
rather than a contractual licence in circumstances where there is a fetter on the right of a party 
to terminate the tenancy. It appears, however, from Mexfield that the certainty of term rule 
operates as a bar to contractual freedom in relation to a contractual lease. Nevertheless, it is 
somewhat incongruous that in Mexfield, certainty of term was a bar to creating a contractual 
lease whereas in Bruton, contractual freedom to create a tenancy was not limited by the nemo 
dat principle or numerus clausus in circumstances where the landlord only had a licence and 
no estate out of which he could grant a proprietary tenancy. Lord Neuberger in Mexfield 
distinguished Bruton as being “about relativity of title which is the bedrock of English land 
law” in a case where he stated that the tenancy would be binding on an assignee of the tenant 
and the landlord,75 thus bestowing quasi-proprietary status on a contractual lease.  
 
Although the numerus clausus principle was not expressly articulated by any of the judges in 
Mexfield, implicit within the approach was a need to avoid the inevitable result of the 
numerus clausus principle, that is that the tenancy on its terms would be void for uncertainty. 
The approach to private law in Mexfield, for the sake of the protection of the tenant and the 
wider cause of social justice, enabled the judges to reconfigure property rights and is 
therefore symbolic of a progressive approach to property law. As Weir argues, the 
conservative influence of numerus clausus on property interests is being increasingly 
disrupted by the impact of judicial activism and by statutory property interests based on 
social and environmental forces, which seek to loosen the bonds of this principle.76  
 
Although contractual rights are generally freely customizable, whereas property rights are 
restricted to a closed list of standardised forms,77 there is in Mexfield an incursion into 
contractual freedom limiting the ability of parties to create contractual non-proprietary fetters 
and hold under a periodic tenancy. This is due to the subliminal effect on proprietary rights if 
contractual fetters were recognised to be valid. Although numerus clausus makes sense from 
an economic perspective, because permitting free customization of new forms of property 
would impose significant external costs on third parties, insisting on a “one size fits all” 
system of property rights would frustrate those legitimate objectives that can be achieved 
only by using different property rights that fall short of full ownership.78 By arguing for 
incorporation of difficult-to-define qualities such as virtue or flourishing, progressive 
                                                             
74 Bruton v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [1999] 3 W.L.R. 150 
75 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [65]. 
76 M. Weir, “Pushing the Envelope of Proprietary Interests: the Nadir of the Numerus Clausus Principle?” 
(2015-2016) 39 Melb. U. L. Rev. 651.  
77 T.W. Merrill and H.E. Smith, “Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus 
Principle” (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 1, 68-69.  
78 T.W. Merrill and H.E. Smith, “Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus 
Principle” (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 1, 69. 
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proponents of these qualities implicitly assert that the values of simplicity and formalism in 
property law do not exhaust the field.79 
 
Chang and Smith argue that in between the strict numerus clausus principle and the 
restriction-free numerus apertus principle, a compromise is to allow property customs to 
create new, de jure property forms where they impose tolerable information costs and prevent 
numerus clausus from becoming a straitjacket on property.80 Whilst constructing their 
arguments within the context of U.S. law, a parallel can be drawn with English law to allow a 
tenancy agreement to be a proprietary interest even though it is subject to a contractual fetter 
on either or both parties. As they argue, a statutory monopoly on property creation would be 
sub-optimal, because new property forms with net social value may not be created. An 
intermediate institutional arrangement under which statutes and courts can both create new 
property forms, “might strike the right balance between frustration costs and measurement 
costs and between spontaneous order and designed order”.81 This would enable leases to 
adapt to the twenty-first century and provide protection to occupiers of land without having to 
resort to technical, ancient common law rules as in Mexfield. 
 
The future of implied periodic tenancies is important in circumstances where Mexfield does 
not apply. Mexfield does not apply to sub-leases, because a tenancy for life cannot be created 
out of a sub-lease. It also cannot apply to corporate tenants, because a company cannot hold a 
tenancy for life.  Accordingly, a lease identical to that in Mexfield granted to a company 
cannot take effect as a lease or as a property right, but as between the original contracting 
parties, may be enforceable as a contract. Lord Clarke expressed his concern that “It is a 
mystery to me why in 2011 the position of a tenant who is a human being and a tenant which 
is a company should in this respect be different”.82 It is nevertheless important that the need 
for proper formalities has not been undermined by Mexfield, because Mexfield only applies if 
all the formalities were complied with for the tenancy agreement83 and did not apply where 
the agreement was oral in Hardy v Haselden.84  
 
Despite criticising the uncertainty rule in the strongest terms, none of the judges in the 
Supreme Court were prepared to jettison the requirement. Lord Neuberger's observation that 
he would “not support jettisoning the certainty requirement, at any rate in this case”85 leaves 
an aperture for future developments. Baroness Hale argued that reconsideration of the 
decision in Prudential case “whether by this court or by Parliament, a matter of some 
urgency”.86 Lord Clarke urged “that the certainty rule should now be abandoned”,87 although 
he agreed that it was not necessary to abandon it for the purposes of this appeal.  
 
                                                             
79 J.B. Baron, “The Contested Commitments of Property” (2009-2010) 61 Hastings L.J. 917 at 920, 922-923. 
See also A.J. van der Walt, “The Modest Systemic Status of Property Rights” (2014) 1 J. L. Prop. & Soc’y 15. 
80 Y. Chang and H.E. Smith, “The Numerus Clausus Principle, Property Customs, and the Emergence of New 
Property Forms” (2014-2015) 100 Iowa L. Rev. 2275, 2279.  
81 Y. Chang and H.E. Smith, “The Numerus Clausus Principle, Property Customs, and the Emergence of New 
Property Forms” (2014-2015) 100 Iowa L. Rev. 2275, 2308.  
82 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [105]. 
83 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [39]-[41] (Lord Neuberger). 
84 Hardy v Haseldon [2011] EWCA Civ 1387, [2011] N.P.C. 122. 
85 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [35]. 
86 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [96]. 
87 Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52 at [105]. 
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Conclusions- new equilibrium? 
Periodic tenancies are undergoing an identity and existential crisis, which has exposed 
various doctrinal dilemmas relating to leases. The decision in Mexfield has important 
repercussions for periodic tenancies, because it was made from a microcosmic perspective to 
resolve the immediate problem before the Supreme Court without analysing fully the long-
term consequences and implications from a macrocosmic perspective. In relation to fetters on 
a landlord and tenant, there is no necessity or requirement for correlation or congruence 
between the two situations of fetters on landlords and tenants. Because there was no thorough 
analysis and examination of the consequences of the decision in Mexfield by the Supreme 
Court of a fetter on the tenant, any statements in this regard are therefore obiter, and the 
arguments in favour of an asymmetrical approach are compelling. Consequently, in relation 
to the factual matrix of a fetter on a tenant, there are cogent reasons for arguing that the court 
would not construe it as a lease for life, would not apply section 149(6) of the Law of 
Property Act 1925, would have no compunction in holding the tenancy void, would not be 
mobilised by rhetoric of unfairness to the landlord, but may still enforce the agreement to 
take effect on the terms of the agreement between the original parties as a contractual licence. 
However, if shifts in the policy matrix of land law and its self-governing norms favour 
occupiers of land who are resisting being bound by the fetters in the original agreement, then 
there may arguably be a return to the Prudential approach of holding the agreement to be 
void and the parties to be bound by a periodic tenancy free of any fetters, so that either party 
can terminate the tenancy at the end of a period. 
 
The irony of the decision in Mexfield is that an agreement which was incapable of 
constituting a tenancy was transmogrified into a 90 year lease.88 Mexfield represents a new 
equilibrium protecting tenants where a lease may otherwise be void, but post-Mexfield, it is 
important that the justifications for a fixed maximum duration should only be significant for a 
lease as an estate. It would be doctrinally coherent to uphold the validity of the proprietary 
periodic tenancy and to acknowledge freedom of bargaining with contractual fetters binding 
between the original parties only and which would therefore be binding on the tenant. 
Structural congruity could still be maintained within the systemic framework of leases 
retaining its constitutive values. Although this result was not ruled out by Mexfield, such a 
solution is not imminent. However, in the dual dichotomy between justice-based and 
certainty-based land law, it is important for the dynamic institution of land law to retain the 
flexibility offered by such an outcome. 
                                                             
88 Acknowledged in Southward Housing Co-operative Ltd v Walker [2015] EWHC 1615 at [70] (Hildyard J). 
